This paper investigates the effect of jobs reservation on improving the economic opportunities to persons belonging to India"s Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). Using employment data from the 55 th NSS round we estimate the probabilities of different social groups in India being in one of three categories of economic status: own account workers; regular salaried or wage workers; casual wage labourers. We use these probabilities to decompose the difference between group X and forward caste Hindus in the proportions of their members in regular salaried or wage employment. This decomposition allows us to attribute a proportion of this difference to "attribute" differences" between group X and forward caste Hindus, the remainder being due to "coefficient" differences. We measure the effects of positive discrimination in boosting the proportions of ST/SC persons in regular salaried employment and the discriminatory bias against Muslims who do not benefit from such policies. We conclude that the boost provided by jobs reservation policies was around 5 percentage points. We also conclude that an alternative, and more effective, way of raising the proportion of men, from the SC/ST groups, in regular salaried or wage employment would be to improve their employment-related attributes.
Introduction
In response to the burden of social stigma and economic backwardness borne by persons belonging to some of India"s castes, the Constitution of India allows for special provisions for members of these castes. Articles 341 and 342 include a list of castes and tribes entitled to such provisions and all those groups included in this listand subsequent modifications to this list -are referred to as, respectively, "Scheduled Castes" (SC) and "Scheduled Tribes" (ST) 1 .
These special provisions have taken two main forms. The first is action against adverse discrimination towards persons from the SC and the ST. The second is compensatory discrimination in favour of persons from the SC and the ST.
Compensatory discrimination has taken the form of guaranteeing seats in national and state legislatures and in village panchayats, places in educational institutions, and the reservation of a certain proportion of government jobs for the SC and the ST.
In the mind of the Indian public it is jobs reservation that is seen as the most important of the public concessions towards the SC and the ST and it is the one which arouses the strongest of passions. 2 On the one hand, there is the demand to extend reservation to persons who are not from the SC or the ST but who, nevertheless, belong to economic and socially backward groups -the 'other backward classes'
1 Reservation for SC were designed to assist groups who had known centuries of suppression; reservation for ST were designed to assist groups who were traditionally isolated from the modern world and from mainstream society. For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India see Osborne (2001) . 2 In arriving at this judgement about who should be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a person"s caste rather than his/her income or wealth. Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 115 of the Indian Constitution calls "socially and educationally backward classes" have benefited from reservation even though, in practice, many persons belonging to these classes could not be regarded as "socially and educationally backward"; at the same time, many persons belonging to non-backward classes could legitimately be regarded as "socially and educationally backward". Compounding this anomaly is that many of the benefits of reservation have been captured by well-off groups from the depressed classes (for example, chamars ) while poorer groups (for example, bhangis) have failed to 2 (OBC) 3 . On the other hand, there is the demand from the SC and the ST to extend reservation to private sector jobs 4 . Sowell (2003) has remarked that "as the country with the longest history of preferences and quotas for the purpose of advancing poor and disadvantaged groups, India"s experience is particularly relevant to the actual consequences of such programs, as distinguished from their hopes and consequences" (p. 48). Against this observation, and the fact that the India"s 50 year old experiment with affirmative action has been emulated in other countries (Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka), the purpose of this paper is to investigate, using data from the 55 th round (1999) (2000) of the National Sample Survey (Government of India, 2000) , the extent to which jobs reservation for the SC and the ST have benefited persons from these groups in the sense of affording them a greater share of regular salaried and wage employment than they might have had otherwise.
5
The NSS employment and unemployment data give the distribution of its respondents -who are distinguished by various characteristics, including their caste, religion, and educational standard -between different categories of economic status.
Of these categories, the three which are the most important are: self-employed; regular salaried or wage employees; and casual wage labourers. Using these data, benefit. Unfortunately, we are unable to address this issue in this study since the data do not allow a breakdown of the SC by sub-caste. 3 Article 340 of the Indian Constitution empowers the government to create such classes and in 1955, following the report of the "Kalelkar" Commission, 2,339 groups were designated as belonging to the OBC. The 1980 report of the "Mandal" Commission recommended that, in addition to the 23 percent of government jobs reserved for the SC and ST, a further 27 percent be reserved for the OBC. In 1990, the V.P. Singh announced plans to implement this recommendation triggering a wave of "antiMandal" rioting in India. In 1992, India"s Supreme Court, in Sawhney v The Union of India, upheld jobs reservation for the OBC but ruled that: (i) reservation was not to extend to more than 50 percent of the population and (ii) that groups within the OBC category who were manifestly not disadvantaged (the "creamy layer") were to be excluded from reservation. 4 See Bhambri (2005) ; Thorat (2005) .
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The proportion of the (overall) difference, in the proportions of their members in regular salaried and wage employment, between forward caste Hindus and persons in group X which is due to "coefficient differences" (the coefficients contribution) may be interpreted as a measure of "discrimination" against such persons.
If this difference is positive -the proportion of persons in regular salaried and wage employment is higher when the attributes of group X are evaluated using its own coefficients than the coefficients of forward caste Hindus -then discrimination works in favour of group X; on the other hand, if this difference is negative -the proportion of persons in regular salaried and wage employment is smaller when the attributes of group X are evaluated using its own coefficients than the coefficients of forward caste Hindus -then discrimination works against group X. Given that employers might be expected to have a preference for employing forward caste
Hindus, compared to persons from the SC or the ST, 11 jobs reservation policies in favour of applicants from the SC and ST might be expected to blunt discrimination against SC/ST applicants and, possibly, even reverse it.
This study attempts to evaluate the amount by which jobs reservation has benefited persons from the SC and ST in giving them a higher share of regular salaried and wage employment than they might have had in the absence of jobs reservation. It is impossible to evaluate this directly since jobs reservation is an allIndia policy and we cannot distinguish between parts of the country where the policy operated and parts where it did not. However, we can answer this question indirectly by considering a group whose members, though as deprived and poorly qualified as 11 This preference might be engendered by a distaste for persons from such groups (bigotry: Becker, 1971) or by a belief that employees from such groups were inferior workers (statistical discrimination: Phelps, 1972 
Some Methodological Qualifications
This method of measuring discrimination against, or for, group X, described above, needs to be qualified in, at least, three respects. First, note that discrimination is computed conditional upon a given set of attributes. If these attributes are added to, or subtracted from, then the degree of discrimination would also change. For example, if better data on educational qualifications became available, then the degree of discrimination computed from the new data would be different from the original estimate. So, there is no unique degree of discrimination.
Second, even if one could establish a definitive vector of relevant attributes, an unique degree of discrimination might still not be established. This is because the attributes contribution could be computed using either the coefficients of group X or the coefficients of forward caste Hindus and the two methods may not yield the same result. There is nothing in the methodology to suggest that one computation is to be preferred over the other. Consequently, the coefficients difference -computed as the 6 difference between the overall difference and the contribution of attributes difference -would be different depending upon how the attributes contribution was computed.
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So, for this reason also, there is no unique degree of discrimination.
Third, the methodology assumes a one-way relation between attributes and employment outcomes. For example, exogenously given high (low) educational qualifications are likely to lead to good (bad) employment outcomes. This assumed exogeneity of qualifications might be justified at a point in time but, with a broader time frame, it is plausible that past good/bad employment outcomes in the past contribute to present high/low educational qualifications. In other words, there is a two-way relation between qualifications and employment outcomes: qualifications influence employment outcomes but employment outcomes also influence qualifications.
To put it differently, the degree of discrimination as measured by our methodology measures discrimination at a point in time, conditional on a given set of attributes. But the poor attributes of the members of a group may be the result of past discrimination against such persons: the fact that members of a group were denied good jobs in the past was a barrier to their acquiring good educational qualifications and this resulted in their inability to secure good jobs today. Consequently, it needs to be emphasised that the degree of discrimination measured in this study will necessarily understate the "true" (i.e. historical), but unknown, degree of discrimination. India has set up a high-powered committee to look at minority employment and, in particular, to examine why Muslims comprise only a fraction of India"s workforce.
7

Economic Status, Education and Community
Second, this assumption is also consistent with evidence from the field: for example, Jeffery and Jeffery (1997) in their study of Muslims in Bijnor argued that many Muslims regarded their relative economic weakness as stemming from their being excluded from jobs due to discriminatory practices in hiring. The belief that their sons would not get jobs then led Muslim parents to devalue the importance of education as an instrument of upward economic mobility.
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A striking feature of Table 1 is how few men were seeking, and/or available for, work: only 1,639 men (2 per cent of the total) were unemployed in the conventional meaning of the term. Moreover, job search appeared to be the prerogative of better educated men: of the 1,639 "unemployed" men, 76 percent were educated to secondary level or above and 40 percent were graduates or postgraduates. men); unable to work owing to a disability (448 men); beggars and prostitutes (42 men); and "others" (729 men). 15 However, there may be cases where self employment is the preferred outcome over the available choices. We are unable to take account of such preferences because all we observe is the outcome and not the reasons for the outcome. Table 2 shows the distribution of prime-age men across the categories of economic status by religion and caste. Since nearly one in ten persons from the OBC were Muslim, they are identified, in this study, separately from the non-Muslims (mostly Hindu, but some Sikhs) of the OBC. Table 2 clearly shows that OBC primeage males were different from those belonging to the SC in two important respects.
First, both Muslim and non-Muslim OBC men were more likely to be in self employment (45 and 41 percent respectively) than men from the SC (28 percent).
Second, both Muslim and non-Muslim OBC men were less likely to work as casual labourers (27 and 25 percent respectively) than men from the SC (47 percent).
Prime-age males from the OBC also differed from their forward caste Hindu and (non-OBC) Muslims.
10 Lastly, Table 3 shows the education standards of prime-age men from the different communities. Non-Christian men from the ST, along with men from the SC, had the lowest level of educational achievement: 52 percent of the former and 43 percent of the latter were illiterate. They were followed by Christian men from the ST (35 percent of whom were illiterate) and Muslims (35 percent of Muslims from the OBC, and 33 percent of non-OBC Muslims, were illiterate). The best educated men were forward caste Hindus and (non-ST) Christians: only 10 percent of Hindu, and only 6 percent of Christian, prime-age men were illiterate while 24 percent of Hindu, and 18 percent of Christian, prime-age men were graduates.
A Multinomial Logit Model of Economic Status Outcomes
The multinomial logit model has been used to analyse occupational outcomes by inter alia: Schmidt and Strauss (1975) Table 4 shows the results of estimating a multinomial logit model for 66,397 prime-age men who were in non-family employment, that is in one of the following (mutually exclusive) categories of economic status: own account workers; regular salaried or wage employment; casual wage labourers. Excluded from the analysis were: 1,023 prime-age men who were employers, 8,476 prime-age men who were unpaid family workers, and 1,639 men who were searching and/or available for work.
The coefficient estimates shown in Table 4 are to be interpreted as the change in the log risk-ratios, Pr( ) log Pr ( A positive coefficient implies that the ratio increases and a negative coefficient implies that it decreases 18 . Because the community and the education standard categories (see Table 4 for a full listing), in addition to being mutually exhaustive, were also collectively exhaustive, one of the communities, and one of the education standards, had to be omitted from the equation in order to avoid multicollinearity in the presence of the intercept term: forward caste Hindus and "illiteracy" were the two omitted or residual categories. The variables relating to the included communities and 18 However, the direction of change in the probability of an outcome, consequent upon a unit change in ik X , cannot be inferred from the sign of jk  . The reason is that, in a multinomial model, a change in the value of a variable for a person changes the probability of every outcome for him/her. Since these changes are constrained to sum to zero, whether the probability of a particular outcome goes up or down depends on what happens to the probabilities of the other outcomes.
education standards were binary variables, taking the value 1 if a man belonged to that community, or had that standard of education, and zero if he did not.
As observed earlier, the signs of the coefficient estimates associated with a variable -which, consequent upon a unit change in the value of the variable, reflect the directions of change in the risk-ratios -do not predict the directions of change in the probabilities of the outcomes. The changes in the probabilities of the outcomes, following a change in the value of a variable, are the marginal probabilities associated with that variable. 19 These marginal probabilities are shown in the right hand panel of Table 4 .
The effects of changing the value of a dummy variable -as are all the variables in Table 7 -are analysed by comparing the probabilities when the dummy variable takes the value of the 'reference' group with the probabilities that result from the dummy variable taking the value relevant to another group, the values of all the other variables being held constant at their mean values.
Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes
For example, the marginal probabilities against the SC group in Table 4 
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The pattern of marginal probabilities for the (non-Muslim) OBC was similar to that of the SC: relative to forward caste Hindus, the probability of being in self employment fell, and the probability of being a casual wage labourer rose, for both groups. However, compared to the SC group, the marginal probabilities for the (nonMuslim) OBC show that the fall in the probability of self employment, and the rise in the probability being casual wage labourers, was much smaller but the fall in the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment was greater.
Muslims
In contrast to the SC (and the non-Muslim OBC), the pattern of marginal probabilities for Muslims, whether from the OBC or not, was similar: relative to forward caste Hindus, the probabilities of being in self employment and of being casual wage labourers rose, and the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment fell, for both groups. The marginal probabilities for (non Other Backward Caste) Muslims 21 , suggest that the probability of being self employed would rise by 0.032 points and the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment would fall by 0.053 points. The rise in the probability of self employment was much higher for Other Backward Caste Muslims, compared to non OBC Muslims (0.064 against 0.032), but the fall in the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment more precipitous (0.073 against 0.053), for the former, compared to the latter, group.
Christians and Scheduled Tribes
The pattern of marginal probabilities associated with non-Christian persons from the ST were very similar to that for Scheduled Caste persons: relative to forward caste Hindus, the probabilities of being in self employment fell by 0.162 points nonChristian persons from the ST (compared to a fall of 0.194 points for persons from the SC), and the probabilities of being in casual wage labourer rose by 0.184 points (compared to a rise of 0.201 points for persons from the SC); by contrast, the fall in the probability of being in self-employment (0.078 points) and the rise in the probability of being in casual, wage labour (0.104 points) was much more muted for
Christian persons from the ST.
By contrast, non-tribal Christians had a greater propensity for salaried employment than forward caste Hindus: relative to forward caste Hindus, the probabilities of non-tribal Christians being in salaried employment rose by 0.053 points the probability of being self employed fell by 0.066 points.
Education Standards
The marginal probabilities associated with the education standards show that, relative to illiteracy, rising education standards lowered the probabilities of being self employed or a casual wage labourer and increased the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment. Compared to illiterate prime-age men, this culminated in graduate prime-age males having probabilities of being: in regular salaried or wage employment, 0.5 points higher; casual wage labourers, 0.272 points lower; self employed, 0.229 points lower.
Improvements in the standard of education led to progressively greater increases in the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment. Self employment could be regarded as the next most desirable outcome and being a casual wage labourer as the least desirable. Improvements in the standard of education led to a fall in the probabilities of being self employed and being a casual wage labourer but, with improvements in the education standard, the fall in the probability of being a casual wage labourer was considerably greater than the fall in the probability of being self employed.
The Decomposition of Probabilities: Salaried and Wage Employment
The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) method of decomposing group differences in means into an "explained" and a "residual" component has been extended to explaining group differences in probabilities, derived from models of discrete choice with binary outcomes, by Gomulka and Stern (1990); Blackaby et. al. (1997 Blackaby et. al. ( ,1998 Blackaby et. al. ( ,1999 ; and by Nielsen (1998) . This methodology can be extended, as shown in Borooah (2005) , to models of discrete choice with multiple (i.e. more than two) outcomes.
As observed earlier, regular salaried or wage employment could be regarded as the most desirable of the three categories of economic status analysed, the other two being self employment and casual wage labourer. Table 5 and 6 show the decomposition of the difference between "community X" and forward caste Hindus in the proportions of their members in regular salaried or wage employment. We illustrate the discussion by considering Muslims and the SC.
Muslims and Scheduled Castes
The column headed 'sample average' in Tables 5 and 6 Since forward caste Hindus would have had a higher probability of salaried employment if they had been treated as SC, and a lower probability if they had been treated as Muslims, SC coefficients were more favourable, and Muslim coefficients were less favourable, to securing regular salaried or wage employment, compared to the coefficients for forward caste Hindus. Given that employers might be expected to have a preference for employing forward caste Hindus, compared to Muslims and persons from the SC, jobs reservation policies in favour of applicants from the SC were strong enough to reverse employer bias against this group, at least as far as prime-age men were concerned. However, since such policies did not extend to Muslims they did not receive protection from any employer bias against them. Table 5 . However, if prime-age men from the SC had been treated as Hindus, their probability of being in salaried employment would have risen from 19.4 percent to 20.5 percent (Table 6 ) implying a slight coefficients bias against the SC in contrast to the slight pro-SC coefficients bias suggested by Table 5 . Table 5 and 6 shows that the following seven groups were in "employment deficit" vis-à-vis forward caste Hindus meaning that the proportion of prime-age males from these groups who were in regular salaried or wage employment was less than the corresponding proportion of forward caste Hindus: Notwithstanding this advantage, the proportion of non-Christian prime-age men from the ST, and prime-age men from the SC, in regular salaried or wage employment (respectively, 14.0 and 19.4 percent) was much lower than the 38.7 percent of forward caste Hindu men so employed. This entire difference, as Tables 7 and 8 show, could be ascribed to the relative lack of employment-friendly attributes (mostly, lower educational achievements) among men from the SC and (non-Christian) from the ST. Table 3 pointed to the gulf in education standards between these two groups on the one hand and forward caste Hindus on the other. 22 Given this gulf, current demands in India for extending, for example, jobs reservation for the SC and the ST to the private sector are misplaced: further improvements in coefficients bias towards these groups will do little to improve their effectiveness as employees; on the other hand, strengthening their, currently weak, employment-friendly attributes will.
Employment Deficit and Surplus Groups
Tables 7 and 8 show that of the groups which were in employment deficit, and which did not benefit from jobs reservation policies, non-Muslim OBC had the smallest deficit (16.1 points), followed by Muslims not from the OBC (16.4 points), followed by Muslims from the OBC (21.1 points). Tables 7 and 8 also allow one to deduce for these groups how much of their employment deficit was due to coefficients bias against them and how much was due to the fact that their attributes were less employment-friendly than those of forward caste Hindus. Table 7 ("Hindus treated as community X") shows that only 11 percent of the employment deficit of non-Muslim prime-age men from the OBC (1.8 points out of 16.1) could be blamed on coefficient bias, attribute disadvantage accounting for the remaining 89 percent; Table 8 ("community X treated as Hindus") computes these proportions as 12 and 88 percent, respectively. However, from Table 7 , 33 percent of the employment deficit of Muslims not from the OBC (Table 5: 5.4 points out of 16.4), and 37 percent of the employment deficit of Muslims from the OBC (Table 5: 7.8 points out of 21.1), could be blamed on coefficients bias 23 ; Table 8 Tables 7 and 8 show that of the difference of 5.3 points between the employment rates of Christian and forward caste Hindu men, almost all could be attributed to the coefficient bias (entirely unaided by any jobs reservation)
towards Christian men.
The Effectiveness of Jobs Reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
The purpose of reserving a certain proportion of jobs for members of a particular group is to enable a greater proportion of its members to be in employment than would have been possible without such reservation. In the absence of reservation, the reluctance of employers to hire persons from certain groups -whether through "taste based" or "statistical" discrimination -would mean that ceteris paribus job seekers from disfavoured groups would be relatively less successful in finding jobs. For example, Tables 7 and 8 show that, relative to forward caste Hindus, Muslim men faced quite severe coefficients bias: purely on account of their religion, the probability of Muslim men being in regular salaried or wage employment was lower than that of forward caste Hindus.
But even without coefficient bias, low levels of education and poor qualifications within a community would mean that only a small proportion of its members would 21 succeed in securing salaried employment. For example, Table 6 shows that if the attributes of prime-age Muslim men from the OBC were evaluated using forward caste Hindu coefficients (i.e. one abstracted from coefficients bias) only 23.5 percent of Muslims, compared to 38.7 percent forward caste Hindus, would be in regular salaried or wage employment.
Jobs reservation cannot alter the employment-related attributes of the SC and the ST but, given those attributes, it can raise the proportion of persons from these groups who secure regular salaried or wage employment, i.e. it can shift coefficient bias in favour of these groups. In order to see how effective jobs reservation was in 
Conclusions
The goal of jobs reservation in India has been to bring about an improvement in the welfare of those who are, and have been for a long time, economically and socially depressed. This paper attempt to quantify the effects of reserving jobs in India for persons from the SC and ST. Our conclusion is that jobs reservation Our second conclusion is that the extension of jobs reservation policies to persons from the OBC is misconceived. As argued earlier, only 11 percent of the employment deficit which non-Muslim OBC males faced, relative to forward caste Hindus, could be ascribed to coefficient bias ("discrimination"); one the other hand, between 33-37 percent of the employment deficit faced by Muslims could be ascribed to discrimination. So, if the object of jobs reservation is to correct for discriminatory bias in the jobs market, and if reservation is to be extended beyond the SC and ST, then Muslims have a more compelling case than persons from the non-Muslim OBC.
Our last conclusion is that jobs reservation policies placed little emphasis on improving the job-related attributes of persons from the SC and ST. Given the gulf in educational standards between forward caste Hindus and persons from the SC and ST, to which we have drawn attention, another prong of policy could, indeed should, focus on improving the educational standards of SC and ST persons. This needs to be more than reserving places in Management, Engineering, and Medical schools for persons. Such reservation, in the context of the general backwardness of the SC and ST communities, is little more than a cosmetic exercise, confined to urban areas, and assisting members of these groups who are least in need of help.
The root of the problem lies in the many dysfunctional primary and secondary schools, in the villages and towns of India, characterised by an absence of learning materials, teachers, and, sometimes, even classrooms. It is in these schools that learning is stifled for the millions of children. Compounding the problem of dysfunctional schools is the poverty of parents, many of whom are from the SC and the ST, who cannot afford to keep children on at school; indeed, given the poor 25 quality of schooling that their children receive, they see no reason for making sacrifices for their children"s education.
Admittedly, tackling the problem at its roots will only yield results after a long delay. Nor does the emphasis on effective learning at school carry the glamour associated with being a putative graduate of the Indian Institute of Technology, the Indian Institute of Management, or the All-India Medical Institute. But, before the vast mass of educationally and economically deprived children in India can meaningfully enter the portals of Universities and Institutes of Higher Education they need to go to good schools. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Notes to Table 2 : SE=self-employed; EMP=employer; RSWW=regular salaried or wage worker; CWW=casual wage worker; SKW=seeking work. First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second figure is row percentage; third figure is column percentage. Source: NSS 55 th Round . 0.2505 Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Significant marginal probabilities in bold In each marginal probability cell: the figure in the first row is the marginal probability, prob/x; the figure in the second row is the mean value of x, the relevant variable. 
